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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1992 when the Uruguay Round concluded and the world agreed to phase-
out textile quotas, the U.S. textile industry, which had not been in favor of the
phase-out, could at least find solace in the fact that it had obtained a ten-year
phase-out period. Further, because China was not a member of the World
Trade Organization (WTO) and could not participate in the quota phase-out,
the U.S. textile industry had reason to hope it would not have to face the
world's most competitive textile producing country without quota protection.
Eight years later, Chinajoined the WTO and positioned itself to participate
in the anticipated increase in textile markets when quotas were phased out. I
remember talking to a professional staffer at the American Textile Manufac-
turer's Institute when the WTO accession agreement with China was being
finalized. Having failed in their effort to obtain a ten-year phase-out of textile
quotas for China, the staffer expressed some relief that the agreement had a
textile safeguard that would be much more beneficial to the industry than
traditional safeguard mechanisms. The specific safeguard (the Textile
Safeguard) was contained in section 11.242 of the Report of the Working Party
on the Accession of China to the WTO.1
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Working Party on the Accession of China, Report of the Working Party on the Accession
of China, [ 242, WT/ACC/CHN/49 (Oct. 1, 2001) [hereinafter Working Party Report]. The
provisions of paragraph 242 are as follows:
The representative of China agreed that the following provisions would apply
to trade in textiles and clothing products until 31 December 2008 and be part
of the terms and conditions for China's accession:
(a) In the event that a WTO Member believed that imports of Chinese origin
of textiles and apparel products covered by the [Agreement on Textiles and
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Five years after accession, we have discovered that the Textile Safeguard
in the China agreement is more flexible and easier to impose than most
existing safeguard mechanisms. However, the Textile Safeguard has been
plagued by a rather incomplete regulatory structure, lawsuits, and threats of
retaliation.
Another China-specific safeguard, namely, that safeguard contained in
section 42 1(b) of the Trade Act of 1974,2 has provided U.S. industries with
virtually no effective import relief. Conversely, the Textile Safeguard has
Clothing] as of the date the WTO Agreement entered into force, were, due to
market disruption, threatening to impede the orderly development of trade in
these products, such Member could request consultations with China with a
view to easing or avoiding such market disruption. The Member requesting
consultations would provide China, at the time of the request, with a detailed
factual statement of reasons and justifications for its request for consultations
with current data which, in the view of the requesting Member, showed: (1) the
existence or threat of market disruption; and (2) the role of products of Chinese
origin in that disruption;
(b) Consultations would be held within 30 days of receipt of the request. Every
effort would be made to reach agreement on a mutually satisfactory solution
within 90 days of the receipt of such request, unless extended by mutual
agreement;
(c) Upon receipt of the request for consultations, China agreed to hold its
shipments to the requesting Member of textile or textile products in the
category or categories subject to these consultations to a level no greater than
7.5 percent (6 per cent for wool product categories) above the amount entered
during the first 12 months of the most recent 14 months preceding the month
in which the request for consultations was made;
(d) If no mutually satisfactory solution were reached during the 90-day
consultation period, consultations would continue and the Member requesting
consultations could continue the limits under subparagraph (c) for textiles or
textile products in the category or categories subject to these consultations;
(e) The term of any restraint limit established under subparagraph (d) would be
effective for the period beginning on the date of the request for consultations
and ending on 31 December of the year in which consultations were requested,
or where three or fewer months remained in the year at the time of the request
for consultations, for the period ending 12 months after the request for
consultations;
(f) No action taken under this provision would remain in effect beyond one
year, without reapplication, unless otherwise agreed between the Member
concerned and China; and
(g) Measures could not be applied to the same product at the same time under
this provision and the provisions of Section 16 of the Draft Protocol.
The Working Party took note of these commitments.
2 19 U.S.C.A. § 245 1(b) (2004) [hereinafter Trade Act].
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been invoked four times since China quotas began to be lifted and has provided
a measure of relief for the U.S. textile industry.
In the fall of 2004, nine petitions were filed with the Committee for the
Implementation of Textile Agreements (CITA) seeking relief under the Textile
Safeguard once quotas were lifted in January 2005.' The petitions alleged that
imports from China threatened market disruption and threatened the orderly
development of trade. The petitioners sought import relief from a surge of
imports that was certain to occur once the textile quotas were lifted. CITA
accepted all of those petitions for investigation. The petitions created an
immediate controversy as importing interests argued that the Textile Safeguard
provided no authority for import remedies based on a "threat" of market
disruption. The investigations ground to a halt when the U.S. Court of
International Trade granted a preliminary injunction preventing CITA from
even investigating whether there was a threat of market disruption.4
H. DISCUSSION OF THE APPLICABLE LEGAL STANDARD
The petitioners in the nine cases argued that there was no question that the
Textile Safeguards authorized a threat-based claim. The language of the
Textile Safeguard authorized consideration of threat claims. CITA itself had
made clear several months earlier when it took its first positive action under
the safeguard authority that a threat-based finding was appropriate. While the
guidelines issued by CITA to implement the Textile Safeguard do not
explicitly establish a standard to evaluate a "threat" of market disruption,5
ample precedent in U.S. trade law exists for CITA to be able to evaluate such
a claim.
3 See UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, INTERNATIONAL TRADE ADMINISTRA-
TION, OFFICE OF TEXTILES AND APPAREL, REQUESTS FOR CHINA TEXTILE SAFEGUARD ACTION
FILED WITH THE COMMITrEE FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF TEXTILE AGREEMENTS (CITA) SINCE
OCTOBER 8,2004, http://otexa.ita.doc.gov/chinareldecl.pdf.
4 U.S. Ass'n of Imps. of Textiles & Apparel v. United States, 350 F. Supp. 2d 1342 (Ct.
Int'l Trade Dec. 30, 2004), rev'd, 413 F.3d 1344 (Fed. Cir. June 28, 2005).
5 See Committee for the Implementation ofTextile Agreements Procedures for Considering
Requests from the Public for Textile and Apparel Safeguard Actions on Imports from China, 68
Fed. Reg. 27787 (May 21, 2003) [hereinafter Safeguard Procedures]. The procedures were
clarified by notice issued August 18, 2003. Committee for the Implementation of Textile
Agreements, Solicitation of Public Comments on Request for Textile and Apparel Safeguard
Action on Imports from China, 68 Fed. Reg. 49440 (Aug. 18, 2003).
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lH. LANGUAGE OF THE TEXTILE SAFEGUARD
Sub-paragraph (a) of the Textile Safeguard provides:
In the event that a WTO Member believed that imports of
Chinese origin of textiles and apparel products.., were, due to
market disruption, threatening to impede the orderly develop-
ment of trade in these products, such Member could request
consultations with China with a view to easing or avoiding such
market disruption. The Member requesting consultations would
provide China, at the time of the request, with a detailed factual
statement of reasons and justifications for its request for consul-
tations with current data which, in the view of the requesting
Member, showed: (1) the existence or threat of market disrup-
tion; and (2) the role of products of Chinese origin in that
disruption.6
The Textile Safeguard twice references a threat standard and also authorizes
a member to request consultations to avoid market disruption. In its discussion
of evidence to be presented to China in a Textile Safeguard consultation,
section 11.242 of the Report of the Working Party states that the evidence
provided to China should show the "existence or threat of market disruption,"
indicating again that the "threat" of market disruption was a proper consider-
ation for member countries.7
The Textile Safeguard further provides that a country can act to ease or
avoidthe market disruption believed by the country to exist. A country avoids
market disruption (or disruption to the orderly development of trade) by taking
action before such disruption is found to exist. One cannot avoid that which
has already happened.
The language in section 11.242 differs from other, better-known trade
remedies for several very specific reasons. The negotiators knew that trade in
textiles and apparel was generally subject to import quotas that would tend to
limit import growth in the time period immediately preceding the lifting of
such quotas. Therefore, previous standards of injury that were largely
dependent upon a finding that imports had already increased dramatically
6 Working Party Report, supra note 1, 242 § (a) (emphasis added).
7Id.
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would not adequately address the sudden lifting of restrictive import textile
and apparel quotas.8
The drafters knew that the textile and apparel industries in most developed
countries were already experiencing financial difficulties when the China
Accession Agreement was finalized. They knew at that time that these
industries could not withstand a dramatic surge in textile and apparel imports
from China. They clearly believed it was important to ensure that these
industries were provided the opportunity to adjust to this new, increased
competition.
A. Determination by CITA
CITA itself had previously determined that the Textile Safeguard supported
requests for consultations based upon a threat of market disruption and a threat
to the orderly development of trade. In its December 2003 announcement that
it was requesting consultations with China concerning imports of Chinese-
origin knit fabric, CITA stated that a finding of a threat of market disruption
supported a request for consultations with China:
The United States believes that imports of Chinese origin knit
fabric are, due to market disruption, threatening to impede the
orderly development of trade in knit fabric, and that imports of
knit fabric from China play a significant role in the existence of
market disruption. Further, the United States believes that
imports of Chinese origin knit fabric are, due to the threat of
market disruption, threatening to impede the orderly development
of trade in knit fabric, and that imports of knit fabric from China
play a significant role in the threat of market disruption. Either
finding supports a request for consultations with the Government
of the People's Republic of China under Paragraph 242 of the
Even existing trade remedy statutes, however, such as the Product-Specific Safeguard are
directed to situations where a product is being imported in increased quantities or under such
conditions as to threaten market disruption---clearly indicating that even under the Product-
Specific Safeguard, the drafters intended to cover situations where the quantity of imports
presently entering the member country might not be the only relevant consideration. The textile
petitioners argued that there may be other "conditions" that also threaten market disruption
where current import levels are dampened by the existence of quotas.
2005]
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Report of the Working Party on the Accession of China to the
World Trade Organization. 9
In addition, the notice for comments issued by CITA with respect to the
nine threat-based petitions indicated that CITA conclusively determined that
section 11.242 of the Working Party Report enables member countries to
request consultations based upon the threat of market disruption evidenced by
an anticipated increase in imports:
In light of the considerations set forth in the Procedures, the
Committee has determined that the Requestors have provided the
information necessary for the Committee to consider the request.
The Committee is soliciting public comments on the request, in
particular with regard to whether there is a threat of disruption to
the U.S. market for knit fabric and, if so, the role of Chinese-
origin knit fabric in that disruption."°
CITA's actions under the Textile Safeguard made it clear that it believed it had
authority to accept threat-based petitions. What was not at all clear was what
standard it would use to evaluate these types of petitions.
B. Standard of Evaluation
The petitioners in the nine cases made two points. First, there was
sufficient precedent in analogous U.S. trade law to provide guidance to CITA
in evaluating whether there was sufficient evidence indicating a threat of
market disruption. The petitioners also argued that the Textile Safeguard was
different and established a lower threshold than did other U.S. import
remedies.
Decisions by other U.S. agencies in cases involving a threat of market
disruption provided an appropriate starting point for CITA's analysis. In anti-
' Committee for the Implementation of Textile Agreements, Announcement of Request for
Bilateral Textile Consultations with the Government of the People's Republic of China and the
Establishment of an Import Limit for Knit Fabric, Category 222, Produced or Manufactured in
the People's Republic of China, 68 Fed. Reg. 74944, 74945 (Dec. 29, 2003).
0 Committee for the Implementation of Textile Agreements, Solicitation of Public
Comments on Request for Textile and Apparel Safeguard Action on Imports from China, 69 Fed.
Reg. 75516 (Dec. 17, 2004).
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dumping cases involving a threat of material injury," the U.S. International
Trade Commission has stated that, the Commission is to determine:
[W]hether the U.S. industry is threatened with material injury by
reason of the subject imports by analyzing whether "further
dumped or subsidized imports are imminent and whether material
injury by reason of imports would occur unless an order is issued
or a suspension agreement is accepted." The Commission may
not make such a determination "on the basis of mere conjecture
or supposition," and considers the threat factors "as a whole" in
making its determination whether dumped or subsidized imports
are imminent and whether material injury by reason of subject
imports would occur unless an order is issued. In making our
determination, we consider all statutory threat factors that are
relevant to these investigations. 2
The statutory threat factors often considered relevant in these types of
investigations are also listed in section 771 of the Tariff Act of 1930.1"
" Generally, the U.S. International Trade Commission considers that the concept of"market
disruption" includes some finding of material injury, which is a lower standard than the
requirement that one prove "serious injury."
"2 Polyvinyl Alcohol From Germany and Japan, USITC Inv. Nos. 731-TA-1015-1016, 30
(U.S. International Trade Commission, June 2003) (determination), http://www.usitc.gov/trade-
remedy/73 1 ad_70 1 cvd/investigations/2002/polyvinyl-alcohol/final/PDF/pub3604.pdf
[hereinafter Polyvinyl].
13 TariffAct of 1930, 19 U.S.C.A. § 1677(7)(F) (1996) [hereinafter TariffAct]. The statute
reads:
(F) Threat of material injury.
(i) In general. In determining whether an industry in the United States is
threatened with material injury by reason of imports (or sales for importation)
of the subject merchandise, the Commission shall consider, among other
relevant economic factors-
(I) if a countervailable subsidy is involved, such information as may be
presented to it by the administering authority as to the nature of the subsidy
(particularly as to whether the countervailable subsidy is a subsidy described
in Article 3 or 6.1 of the Subsidies Agreement), and whether imports of the
subject merchandise are likely to increase,
(II) any existing unused production capacity or imminent, substantial increase
in production capacity in the exporting country indicating the likelihood of
substantially increased imports of the subject merchandise into the United
States, taking into account the availability of other export markets to absorb
any additional exports,
20051
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CITA took note of these precedents in constructing a series of questions
directed to commentators in its notice of investigation in the nine cases.
The general statement contained both in section 771 of the Tariff Act of
1930 and the decision of the International Trade Commission" are also helpful
to CITA and could be adapted to assist in evaluations under section 11.242 of
the Working Party Report.
Evidence relied upon by CITA and presented to China in these cases should
be more than "mere conjecture or supposition."' 5 CITA should evaluate
(III) a significant rate of increase of the volume or market penetration of
imports of the subject merchandise indicating the likelihood of substantially
increased imports,
(IV) whether imports of the subject merchandise are entering at prices that are
likely to have a significant depressing or suppressing effect on domestic
prices, and are likely to increase demand for further imports,
(V) inventories of the subject merchandise,
(VI) the potential for product-shifting if production facilities in the foreign
country, which can be used to produce the subject merchandise, are currently
being used to produce other products,
(VII) in any investigation under this subtitle which involves imports of both
a raw agricultural product (within the meaning of paragraph (4)(E)(iv)) and
any product processed from such raw agricultural product, the likelihood that
there will be increased imports, by reason of product shifting, if there is an
affirmative determination by the Commission under section 1671d(b)(1) or
1673d(b)(l) of this title with respect to either the raw agricultural product or
the processed agricultural product (but not both),
(VIII) the actual and potential negative effects on the existing development
and production efforts of the domestic industry, including efforts to develop
a derivative or more advanced version of the domestic like product, and
(IX) any other demonstrable adverse trends that indicate the probability that
there is likely to be material injury by reason of imports (or sale for importa-
tion) of the subject merchandise (whether or not it is actually being imported
at the time).
(ii) Basis for determination. The Commission shall consider the factors set
forth in clause (i) as a whole in making a determination of whether further
dumped or subsidized imports are imminent and whether material injury by
reason of imports would occur unless an order is issued or a suspension
agreement is accepted under this subtitle. The presence or absence of any
factor which the Commission is required to consider under clause (i) shall not
necessarily give decisive guidance with respect to the determination. Such a
determination may not be made on the basis of mere conjecture or supposi-
tion.
Id. id Polyvinyl, supra note 12.
15 F'.
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whether the evidence as a whole would ordinarily lead it to believe that
increased imports of the subject products from China are imminent and
whether the U.S. industry (or the orderly development of trade) is threatened
with market disruption unless a safeguard limitation is imposed. 6
C. Broad Discretion
The petitioners, however, argued that while these statutory guidelines were
helpful, they were not necessarily dispositive of a threat determination under
the Textile Safeguard. The petitioners argued that section 11.242 of the
Working Party Report granted even broader discretion to the administering
member country.
Much of the applicable U.S. law and precedent concerning a "threat" of
market disruption or other injury from imports has evolved in conjunction with
U.S. law or WTO provisions that required positive determinations by the
administering member that either a "threat" was present or that market
disruption had occurred.
The standard set out in the Working Party Report is notable in that it is
quite different from other legal standards applicable to the institution of
safeguards, either within the World Trade Organization or under U.S. law.
The Textile Safeguard requires only a belief on the part of a WTO member that
imports from China are, due to market disruption, threatening to impede the
orderly development of trade in order for that member to request consultations
with China, while other import remedies, on their face, require more positive
determinations. This "belief' standard suggests that a member would have
even more leeway in evaluating evidence it believed to constitute a threat to
its market or the orderly development of trade than would be the case under
more traditional safeguard language.
The Textile Safeguard provides even more evidence of discretion on the
part of the administering member. It goes on to provide that if the member
determines to initiate consultations based on a belief, the member must provide
China a detailed factual statementjustifying its consultation request and should
supply current data which "in the view of the requesting Member" shows the
" See Tariff Act, supra note 13, at (ii) (providing, in relevant part, "The Commission shall
consider the factors set forth in clause (i) as a whole in making a determination of whether
further dumped or subsidized imports are imminent and whether material injury by reason of
imports would occur unless an order is issued or a suspension agreement is accepted under this
subtitle"). Id.
2005]
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
existence or threat of market disruption and the role of products of Chinese
origin in that disruption. 7 This very subjective language strongly suggests that
a decision by a WTO member to impose safeguards in accordance with section
11.242 should be given broad deference, as it is based on that member's belief
concerning the impact of imports and based on facts evaluated from the point
of view of "the requesting Member."'"
This broad grant of discretion can be contrasted with other import remedies,
such as countervailing duties, anti-dumping duties or even the China Product-
Specific Safeguard. 9 Under U.S. countervailing duty law, the administering
authority must determine that there is a countervailable subsidy, that the
product is imported, sold, or likely to be sold for importation into the U.S., and
that there is a threat of material injury.2"
The China Product-Specific Safeguard, another China-specific safeguard,
was also a part of the accession agreement and was enacted by the United
States as section 421 of the Trade Act of 1974. Under section 421(a), the
application of a safeguard limitation is conditioned on the President making a
determination that a product of China is being "imported into the United States
in such increased quantities or under such conditions as to cause or threaten
to cause market disruption."2" Likewise, in section 421 (b), the International
Trade Commission is tasked with a similar analysis, namely:
the United States International Trade Commission . . . shall
promptly make an investigation to determine whether products of
the People's Republic of China are being imported into the
United States in such increased quantities or under such condi-
'7 Working Party Report, supra note 1, 242(a).
18 Id.
19 This reference is to the import safeguard procedure established in paragraph 16 of the
Protocol of Accession of the People's Republic of China. Those procedures were enacted as
section 421 of the Trade Act of 1974. Trade Act, supra note 2, § 2451.
20 19 U.S.C. § 167 1(a) (providing, in relevant part:
If the administering authority determines that a countervailable subsidy is
being provided with respect to the manufacture, production, or export of a
class or kind of merchandise imported, or sold (or likely to be sold) for
importation, into the United States, and ... the Commission determines
that . . . an industry in the United States . . . is threatened with material
injury... then there shall be imposed upon such merchandise a countervail-
ing duty).
A similar provision applies to anti-dumping actions. See Tariff Act, supra note 13.
2 Trade Act, supra note 2, § 2451(a) (emphasis added).
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tions as to cause or threaten to cause market disruption to the
domestic producers of like or directly competitive products.22
The positive determinations required in traditional safeguard actions and
in other trade remedy provisions are the subject of significant case law and
WTO Agreements designed to ensure that members do not inappropriately
apply these import remedies.23 Conversely, section 11.242 of the Working
Party Report's simply requires a belief by the importing member and relies on
that member's view of the supporting evidence. Section 11.242 is not tied to
existing WTO requirements concerning safeguards, countervailing duties, or
anti-dumping duties,24 nor does there appear to be any other U.S. trade remedy
statute that contains a similar, broad grant of discretion to the administering
authority.
It seems clear that the language of section 11.242 provides the administer-
ing member very broad, almost unprecedented, discretion in evaluating
whether to request consultations with China under its provisions. I would hope
the breadth of this language would be acknowledged by U.S. courts once a
final decision is rendered in the lawsuit in the Court of International Trade, and
I would expect any WTO dispute settlement panel would also be constrained
by the subjective nature of the provision.
22 Id. § 245 1(b) (emphasis added).
23 These WTO Agreements include the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing
Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization,
Annex 1, Legal Instruments-Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994), and the
Agreement on Safeguards, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, Annex 1, Legal Instrument-Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125
(1994).
24 Section thirteen of the Report of the Working Party provides a set of detailed procedures
that must be followed by a member when applying the Product-Specific Safeguard procedures
to imports from China. Working Party Report, supra note 1. Those procedures, however,
clearly apply only to the Product-Specific Safeguard and do not apply to the Textile Safeguard
authorized in section 11.242. This is demonstrated by the specific references to paragraph 16
of the Protocol of Accession contained in section 13 of the Report of the Working Party, as well
as the provision in section 11.242 stating that a country cannot impose concurrent safeguards
under section 11.242 and under the Product-Specific Safeguard.
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IV. CONCLUSION
That CITA acted in the fall of 2004 to investigate allegations of threat of
market disruption should not have come as a surprise to anyone familiar with
import remedies, or to anyone familiar with CITA's previous decisions. It did
apparently come as a surprise to U.S. importers who filed suit in the U.S. Court
of International Trade alleging that the action by CITA was without authority.
The importers asked for and received a preliminary injunction barring CITA
from even investigating the petitions. That preliminary injunction has survived
requests from the government for stays.25 The delay gained by the legal action
allowed 2005 to begin without the threat of the immediate imposition of
safeguard import limits on China imports. The result was, as predicted by
petitioners in the safeguard petitions, a dramatic surge in imports from China.
The Report of the Working Party, and its provision for special safeguards,
signaled to those interested in trade deals, that countries could use specially
crafted trade remedies, beyond the traditional remedies subject to WTO
oversight, to assist agreement on trade deals and to enable participating
countries to accept controversial agreements. The difficulty the United States
is having carrying out some aspects of the Textile Safeguard undermines the
credibility of U.S. negotiators in future trade deals.
The vote on the Central American Free Trade Agreement will apparently
be far closer than it was ever expected to be.26 If the U.S. is to continue to be
a leader in trade negotiations, it may have to find ways to reassure affected
U.S. industries that it can, in fact, effectively implement the trade deals it
claims to have made.
25 In June 2005, the Circuit Court of Appeals overturned the preliminary injunction that was
granted by the Court of International Trade. U.S. Ass'n ofImps. ofTextiles & Apparel v. United
States, 413 F.3d 1344 (Fed. Cir. June 28, 2005).
26 Editors Note: In August 2005, after the date of these remarks, the Dominican Republic-
Central America-United States Free Trade Agreement was implemented by the United States.
Pub. L. No. 109-53, 119 Stat. 462 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. §§ 4001-4111 (2005)).
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